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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Gegenwärtig durchläuft Rußland einen komplizierten Prozeß der Transformation des zentral
geplanten Wirtschaftssystems in eine soziale Marktwirtschaft. Von großer Bedeutung für den
Erfolg dieses Prozesses ist der institutionelle Wandel des landwirtschaftlichen Sektors, insbe-
sondere die Privatisierung von Land und sonstigem Vermögen. Vor dem Hintergrund der
ungünstigen Entwicklung der russischen Landwirtschaft werden in dieser Arbeit die Vorgehen-
sweise und die Probleme der russischen Landwirtschaft ausführlich diskutiert.
SUMMARY
Presently Russia is experiencing the complicated process of transforming the economic system
of central planning into a socially oriented market economy. Of great importance for the suc-
cess of this process is the institutional reshaping of the agricultural sector, particularly the pri-
vatisation of land and assets. In this paper the procedure and the problems of privatising Rus-
sian agriculture are extensively discussed against the background of the unfavourable develop-
ment of the Russian agricultural sector.
REZÜME
V nasto<qee vrem< proishodit sloßnij process transformacii central#izovannoj
upravl<emoj äkonomiki v rynoxnuü. Preobrazovanie (sistemy) institucij
agrarnogo sektora imeet bol#qoe znaxenie dl< uspeha ätogo prozessa, v tom
xisle preßde vsego privatizaci< zemli i imuwestva. V rabote analiziruüts<
meropri<ti< i problemy sel#skogo hoz<jstva Rossii na fone nevygodnogo raz-
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1 PRIVATISATION OF AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES
1.1 Concept and Objective of Privatisation
Presently Russia is experiencing the complicated process of transforming the economic system
of central planning into a socially oriented market economy. Of great importance for the suc-
cess of this process is the institutional reshaping of the agricultural sector, particularly the pri-
vatisation of land and assets.
Until the beginning of 1992 all the land used by the agricultural enterprises was state-owned. It
was somewhat different with the other assets (buildings, machines, current/floating assets):
there were two kinds of agricultural enterprises, sowchozes and colchozes. In the sowchozes,
also the non-land assets were state-owned, whereas in the collective farms they were the prop-
erty of the legal person collective farm.
In a market economy the producer is - in principle - free to choose the products, the distribu-
tor, the buyer, the price, the means of production, the suppliers and the application of his
earnings. This not only contradicts the pre-dominance of the state property, but it even pro-
motes the privatisation of production means, in that profits can be invested in the purchase of
production means. Consequently, private property and the rights and responsibilities connected
with it need to be legally acknowledged.
In principle the actual privatisation of state property through sale or quasi free distribution can
be preceded by leasing or rental. This can be advantageous for the state if the procedural
problems of a sale are not yet solved, e.g. because of a missing land-register in the case of land
sale or missing opening balance sheets in the case of the sale of enterprises. Besides, through
leasing or rentals the restructuring of the enterprise can be initiated and the state can hope to
achieve ultimately higher earnings. On the other hand leasing can also promote corruption.
Thus, the tenants could be tempted to illegally sell state assets or to intentionally drive the
leased enterprise into bankruptcy to be able to purchase it cheaper afterwards. Such examples
can indeed already be observed.
However, experience also shows that a market economy agriculture can emerge on the basis of
leasing land from the state. Therefore, different possibilities exist for the transition period: in
the course of the transition, firstly, the share of privately owned land or assets can zoom or,
secondly, increase gradually. The state can own an important part or even the majority of the
means of production, but in case of leasing it cannot anymore decide on their use. The objec-
tive of the transition period is to provide the legal, institutional, infrastructural and other pre-
conditions for the market economy. This also includes promoting the development of a social
layer of effective owners, in other words the middle classes. These should be able to use their
private property entrepreneurially and profitably. This phase of the transition period can be
characterised as a denationalisation of the property, although not all the assets have yet been
transferred into private hands. Nevertheless, it is a phase of privatisation since the share of pri-
vate property increases in its course.
Therefore, it is proposed to distinguish between privatisation in the wide and in the narrow
sense. By privatisation in the wide sense we understand the process of the gradual growth of
the share of private property until it comprises the majority of all production means in the
economy. These process can start with a denationalisation of the state property. By privatisa-
tion in the narrow sense we understand the direct legal transfer of state property into private
property.EPSTEIN/SIEMER: Difficulties in the Privatization and Reorganization of the Agricultural Enterprises 6
1.2 Tempo and Legal Bases of the Privatisation
Privatisation in the wide sense can start with the transfer of the means of production through
lease to the collectives of the enterprises with subsequent purchase. It is possible that with such
a procedure the transition period would have been less painful for the Russian agriculture if it
had been used to work out a simpler and more consistent privatisation procedure, which had
reduced the uncertainty in the enterprises considerably.
However, Russia chose the short way, i.e. the fast privatisation in the narrow sense, the trans-
fer of property rights  with respect to land and assets of the new companies emerging from the
former agricultural enterprises, the colchozes and sowchozes. Privatisation aimed at the crea-
tion of the legal framework necessary for the establishment of agricultural enterprises ready to
meet the challenges of the market economy. It was expected that, if it was possible to leave the
colchozes and sowchozes with land, an important part of the employees would seize the op-
portunity to found farms or small private agricultural enterprises. The remaining workers were
expected to give their assets to the companies of new legal forms and restructure them in such
a way that they could function more efficiently. Privatisation was also supposed to create new
stimuli for the development of household plots. Hence, for three agricultural sectors a new
legal basis was needed:
1. collective companies
2. farms and small private companies
3. household plots.
In contrast to the majority of the agricultural economists the government set large hopes on the
second sector. Collective companies and/or big agricultural enterprises were considered a tem-
porary phenomenon, which was supposed to provide the raw material for a new more effective
structures, i.e. smaller enterprises than in the past, particularly due to the difficulties with re-
gard to effective leadership and management.
Laws, which had still been passed by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR between 1990 and
1991, served as the legal basis for the privatisation of the agricultural enterprises. The law on
the agricultural reform and the soil-codex of the RSFSR stated the equality of state, privately
and collectively shared forms of property. The law on farms allowed any employee of an agri-
cultural enterprise to freely leave the colchoze or the sowchoze with his asset and land. The
land share had to be handed over free of charge to the farmer. In addition the farmers had the
right to receive land from the soil committee of the rayons at an in fact rather small normative
price, calculated on the capitalised ground rent.
1.3 The Procedure of Privatisation
The decree of the President No. 323 from 27 December, 1991 required all agricultural enter-
prises to choose one of the legal forms stated in the law "On Enterprises and Entrepreneurship"
and restructure accordingly within two months (January - February 1992) . Later this time limit
was extended to four months, then one year. In 1993 the enterprises were granted the right to
maintain their earlier legal forms until the passing of the new civil codex and then until 1999. In
practice, 67 per cent of all agricultural enterprises have reorganised themselves until mid 1996.
In this process all employees, pensioners, and also social employees in the agricultural enter-
prises became owners of a land and asset share free of charge. The size of a land share was
determined by dividing the entire land by the number of the legitimate claimants. Thereby an
average size, which had been calculated by the soil committees of the rayons, was not allowedEPSTEIN/SIEMER: Difficulties in the Privatization and Reorganization of the Agricultural Enterprises 7
to be exceeded. Undistributed land was often added to the soil-redistribution-funds in the ray-
ons. A physical piece of land was assigned only to those employees who submitted an official
statement on their leaving the collective in order to establish a farm.
The asset share of each owner was determined depending on the period he/she was employed
with the collective and the amount of his/her salary. The new owners were then allowed to use
their shares for:
• receiving a physical piece of land for the establishment of a farm,
• contributing it as a share into the new enterprise,
• selling it to another employee of the company or to the company itself for a price freely
determined.
Furthermore, the asset and land shares can be bequeathed.
Hence, the property rights for the land shares are rather limited. Sale of the land shares is only
allowed within the company. Contracts concerning the conditions of using the land- and asset
shares through the company were, however, not required. Since this relationship is regulated
by the statute of the company, the interests of the non-asset holders, who are no longer mem-
bers of the company, are disadvantaged.
The decree of the president No. 1767 from 27 October, 1993 granted the owners with the right
to sell their land shares, offer them free of charge, lend against them and to lease them as well
as to bring their land as asset shares into other companies etc. However, the constitution of the
Russian Federation, passed in December 1993, clearly determined that the conditions and order
of the land utilisation were regulated by the federal laws. Therefore, until the passing of the
new soil codex the right of the citizens concerning the use and application of their land shares
remains essentially limited.
In a meeting the members of the newly established companies (the successor companies of the
earlier sowchozes or colchozes) had to choose one of the following legal forms:
• Stock corporation of an open type
• Stock corporation of a closed type
• full or mixed company (comparable to the German "Gesellschaft Bürgerlichen Rechts"
(GBR) and "Kommanditgesellschaft" (KG))




In 1992 the relationship between the newly founded companies and their owners had to be
exhaustively regulated in the statutes of the companies, because corresponding laws on their
legal forms did not exist. The formal process of the privatisation was completed with the pass-
ing of the statute and the registration of the companies by the state enterprises responsible. In
the overwhelming majority of the cases this process was accomplished relatively fast and with-
out essential changes in the relationships between company, management and employees.
However, many enterprises did not register anew and maintained their old designations of col-
choze or sowchoze. Here a high percentage of the employees received a document for their
land share. With the new civil codex of Russia coming into force in January 1995, some legalEPSTEIN/SIEMER: Difficulties in the Privatization and Reorganization of the Agricultural Enterprises 8
forms such as associations of farmers were not permitted anymore. However, such forms as
the full company and the company on trust (limited partnership) were comprehensively de-
scribed.
Table 1: Distribution of companies of different legal forms as on 01 January, 1995
Legal Form Number of Companies average agricultural
area (ha)
All Companies 30521 5675
there of
colchozes 6025 5361
sowchozes, state farms 3592 6151
stock corporations of an open type 320 7049
stock corporations of a closed
type
12862 7049
other associations 140 7049
agricultural co-operatives 2227 5029
collective enterprises 2183 2838
association of farmers 751 2838
private farmers 528 2838
remaining 1893 2838
Remark: A similar average land size of some legal forms marks the average value of the group.
Source: APK (1996, p. 33, 39).
Concerning their nature we now have three fundamentally different groups of agricultural en-
terprises:
1. State-owned enterprises (assets and land are state-owned). These companies comprise 22.1
million hectares of agricultural land,
2. Companies, stock corporations and other forms with collectively-shared property, where
the right to vote depends on the number of asset shares. These economies use over 107.6
million ha of agricultural land,
3. Production co-operatives, among which are also colchozes, i.e. companies with collec-
tively-shared property, in which only those can vote who are employed in this enterprise
and brought in their assets. Here each member of the association has only one wote. Enter-
prises of this type comprise 43.5 million ha of agricultural land.
In addition, until the end of 1995 there emerged 282,300 farms in the course of the privatisa-
tion process comprising 10.5 million ha of agricultural land. Now, 44.5 million families (from a
total of 50 million) own land in the form of household plots, vegetable and other gardens, dat-
schas and residential buildings. Altogether, this amounts to more than 20 million ha of land,
which is more than twice the amount of 1990 (GOSKOMSTAT (ed.) (1995, p. 356). Besides,
there is now the soil redistribution fund, which contains more than 15 million ha agricultural
land available for the increase of the number of farms and household plots and/or their en-
largement.EPSTEIN/SIEMER: Difficulties in the Privatization and Reorganization of the Agricultural Enterprises 9
The change in the structure of the land utilisation for agricultural production purposes in the
process of the privatisation of the land is presented in Table 2:
Table 2: Distribution of agricultural land in Russia (Mill. ha) as on 01 January 1995
1990 1995
all agricultural land 215,6 209,2
thereof
1) land in big agricultural
     companies
211,8 173,2
   a) land of state and
       municipal companies,
       including sowchozes
126,1 22,1
   b) land of production co
       operatives and colchozes





   c) land in stock holding
       companies, associations
       and other forms
4 107,6
2) land in collective
    gardening,  vegetable
    production, animal
    production etc.
3,8 9,3
3) land used by private
    farmers
0 9,3
4) land in ownership of local
    administrations
0 16,2
Source: Computed on the basis of the APK (1996, p. 33).
In this way in the course of the privatisation of the agricultural land the private form of prop-
erty became prevailing - at the beginning of the year 1995 in comparison the state and munici-
pal property comprised only 18 per cent of the land.
1.4 On the Advantages of the Companies of the New Legal Forms
Now we can ask the following question: did the property transfer accomplished on a large
scale in the years 1992 to 1996 result in those potential stimuli which are supposed to contrib-
ute to the improvement of productivity, management, quality of the production, the reduction
of the expenses as well as the promotion of the scientific and technical progress? At present,
this question can only partly be answered with ‘yes’. There are in fact numerous examples of
agricultural companies of different legal forms with which the presented stimuli work in such a
way, that genuine entrepreneurial structures were created and these companies now success-
fully work under the new conditions. This does, however, by no means hold for the majority of
the companies, since most of them work with losses since 1994. As we will show the cause of
these losses lies in the depressive development of the national economy.
Concerning the internal company relationships, that between the asset holders and the company
and that between the management and the employees in fact hardly changed after the formal
registration of the companies.EPSTEIN/SIEMER: Difficulties in the Privatization and Reorganization of the Agricultural Enterprises 10
Until 1994 the companies were not required to make contracts with the share holders on the
usage conditions. Thereby, especially the rights of pensioners, employees in the social sphere
and others not producing in the respective enterprise were clearly cut. Because of the crisis-
like economic development in the majority of the cases no dividend was paid for the shares. In
the best case the companies provided the pensioners and social employees with some economic
services free of charge. In general the share holders, first of all the employees, played practi-
cally no role in the decision making in the enterprise.
It is therefore plausible that the state statistics exhibits no significant differences in the effec-
tiveness between the economic activity of the companies of old and new legal forms
1. The de-
gree of economic freedom of the companies of the old and new legal forms does practically not
differ, likewise the internal relationships have in fact not been changed in this crisis-like situa-
tion.
The first step of the well-known Niþni Novgorod methodology of reorganising agricultural
enterprises, compiled under professor V.J. UZUN, consists of a detailed enlightenment of all
asset holders with respect to their rights regarding the application of their asset and land
shares. The second step is that of an analysis and the splitting up of large, not efficiently man-
ageable companies into smaller ones. A comparison of the economic parameters of reorganised
and not reorganised companies did not show any advantages of the reorganised enterprises
with respect to their production efficiency. One of the reasons for this is probably the fact that
first of all weak enterprises had been reorganised (UZUN and SHAGAIDA 1996). Up to now
clear improvements in efficiency could only be discovered with the five so-called pilot enter-
prises which were the first firms to be reorganised and which consequently were advised very
intensely. The better results of these five companies are connected with a considerable reduc-
tion in the number of employees (UZUN and SHAGAIDA 1996, p. 27).
Let us now proceed to the economic results of the agricultural development from 1992 to
1996.
2 REORGANISATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES
2.1 Economic Results of the Development of Agriculture from 1992 to 1996 and its
Causes
This period is characterised by a major drop in the agricultural production. Between 1991 to
1995 the gross product decreased by 33 per cent, in 1996 a further reduction by 4 to 5 per cent
is expected. In the large agricultural enterprises the production dropped by appr. 45 per cent.
However, as has already been pointed out, the causes for this development do not lie in the
privatisation and reorganisation of the agricultural enterprises, but in the general economic
conditions, which shall be presented here briefly:
1. Decline of the demand for agricultural products and food stuff because of the strong de-
crease of the incomes of the population.
2. Disparity in the price developments: from 1992 to 1996 the prices for production means
increased three times as much as those for agricultural products. For animal production this
proportion even rises to 4 to 5. This disparity of prices is mainly caused by the existence of
                                               
1  In 1994 the number of companies with new legal forms was actually greater than than the number of
col'chozes and sowchozes realizing losses (61 % : 55 %). Higher were also the absolute losses and their re-
lationship with expenses. APK (1995, p. 71).EPSTEIN/SIEMER: Difficulties in the Privatization and Reorganization of the Agricultural Enterprises 11
a number of monopolies in the upstream and downstream sectors. This resulted in high
losses and a liquidity crisis due to which the agricultural enterprises were not any longer
able to finance their floating capital.
3. Increase of food imports with a weak protection of the domestic market.
4. Reduction of the state subsidies for agriculture from 19 per cent of the state budget in
1991, to 15 per cent in 1992 and 3.5 per cent in 1996.
Moreover, the economic crisis added the following causes:
5. Increasing average production costs per unit caused by the dropping production amount.
6. Overaging and withdrawal of capital goods (the extent of technology bought sank on aver-
age to one eighth).
7. Decreasing soil fertility due to a reduction in the application of organic manure (to one
third) and mineral fertilisers (to one eighth), the decrease in liming of the soils and the in-
sufficient maintenance of the melioration systems.
8. Losses in cattle productivity because of a decrease in breeding, the same holds for crop
production.
9. Reduced motivation of the employees caused by sinking real incomes and a frequently de-
layed wage payment, simultaneously theft and working in the private household plots dur-
ing the official working hours increased.
10. Decreasing quality of the managers due to the most dynamic ones leaving for their own
farms or other economic activities (with faster capital turnover).
11. Price increase of credits in the period of hyperinflation to interest rates of 140 to 240 per
cent. This was accompanied by a return on investment in agriculture which was as low as 3
- 7 per cent.
This demonstrates clearly that the fundamental causes for the drop in agricultural production
are by no means connected with the process of privatisation.
Another result of these processes was furthermore an essential rise of the relative share of the
personal household plots at the agricultural production (see Table 3).
Table 3: Share of the different sectors of agriculture at the agricultural gross product
in per cent
1990 1995
big agricultural companies 72 55
private household plots 28 43
private farmers 0 2
Source: APK (1996, p. 39).
The personal household plots contribute substantially to the stabilisation of the agricultural
production. This is accompanied, however, by the simultaneous shift to manual work, lower
productivity and a higher share of subsistency production. Nevertheless, a certain production
reduction in the personal household plots can be ascertained since 1994, since these are closely
connected to the large companies. In 1995 the livestock in the personal household plots, e.g.,
sank between 1 and 3 per cent. According to an estimation by economists not only 3 to 4 per
cent of the agricultural land but more than 40 per cent is used for the production in the per-EPSTEIN/SIEMER: Difficulties in the Privatization and Reorganization of the Agricultural Enterprises 12
sonal household plots. The labour productivity in this sector reaches only about 50 per cent of
the productivity in the colchozes (BOGDANOVSKIJ 1996, p. 17).
Currently the private farmers cultivate only appr. 6 per cent of the agricultural land and pro-
duce 2 per cent of the agricultural gross product. It can be stated that this is the only sector
where a certain production growth was observed in 1995 as compared to 1994.
Let us now proceed to the problems of the large agricultural enterprises.
2.2 Structure of the Enterprises
Since the differences in the legal forms have up to now appeared to have only little influence
on the efficiency of the production, it is important to try to clarify the objective factors allow-
ing an agricultural enterprise to work relatively successfully under the present complicated
conditions, in a time where an important part of the agricultural companies is actually bankrupt
(probably more than 55 per cent). As our research has shown one of the most important suc-
cess factors is the proximity of the companies to large markets, e.g., oblast-centers. For Russia
this seems plausible, if we remember its geographic expansion and the relatively weakly devel-
oped transportation system especially in the rural areas. Our research allows us to distinguish
the following four groups:
• Highly specialised enterprises of an industrial type, usually one-product-companies, which
can also be characterised as factories. These comprise for instance large poultry enter-
prises, cattle fattening complexes, industrial pig fattening factories, fur farms and green-
house-enterprises. The animal production companies of this type work on the basis of pur-
chasing of fodder and raw materials.
• Companies closely situated to cities: in general they are also highly specialised, however,
they combine the more profitable plant production with their animal production activities.
• Companies which are located far away from the oblast-centres and from other cities of the
region: the situation depends on the region, its configuration, the population density etc..
• Companies with a medium distance to the markets: these are companies not belonging to
the first three groups.
As the result of the analysis of the agricultural enterprises in the St. Petersburg oblast, which
was accomplished jointly with Z. LERMAN (LERMAN and EPSTEIN 1995), we came to the con-
clusion that the companies close to the cities had the most favourable economic situation.
Their profitability (the relationship of the profit and their basic funds) exceeded that of the en-
terprises of medium distance by approximately 65 per cent and that of the companies far away
by 3.3 times. They usually have their own processing facilities for agricultural products as well
as shops in the city. Due to the more intense state support in the time before the reforms they
are better equipped with funds, technology etc. Because of the proximity to the city they em-
ploy more highly qualified workers and have less problems with unused labour capacity. These
companies are usually centralised and well managed. They profit from the large market, higher
sale prices and lower transport costs. Consequently, more than half of the companies close to
the cities work profitably.
The situation of many factories, particularly the fattening enterprises, is very unfavourable be-
cause of the low prices for animal products and the high costs for the purchase of grains,
mixed fodder and other resources. In order to work profitably they must reduce the expenses
for fodder per unit product by 40 to 50 per cent (NAZARENKO 1996, p. 12), a task which in theEPSTEIN/SIEMER: Difficulties in the Privatization and Reorganization of the Agricultural Enterprises 13
next three to five years does not seem realisable. Only the situation for the egg-producing
companies and greenhouse-enterprises can be characterised as relatively favourably.
The companies situated remote from the markets do not only suffer from considerably higher
transport costs, they also have to cope with a less solvent demand and thus achieve lower
prices for their products. Already before the reforms they had considerably smaller base funds
at their disposal, and also the quality of their management as well as of the most important
employees is lower. Additionally, the soils and climatic conditions are generally worse for the
remote companies than for the average of the region. According to our estimate already in
1994 the bulk of the remote companies (about 25-40 per cent of all companies) did not make
profits. Here specific economic and social problems meet, a point on which we will elaborate
later.
The group of the companies with medium distance lies between those close and those far away
from the cities. One part of these enterprises still has the chance to develop positively, but un-
der the present conditions their number will probably be considerably less than 50 per cent.
In our view, proposals for the further course of the privatisation of the Russian agriculture
must consider the differences shown and submit concepts created specifically for the need of
the different groups. Thus, for the companies situated closely to the cities centralised manage-
ment structures with a well developed accounting systems for the subdivisions appear to be
useful. In general, the employees of these enterprises  reject the division of their enterprise into
smaller units. In contrast, the remote companies can preserve a part of their potential only by
splitting into smaller units. If there are some energetic employees, at least some of them have
the chance to survive. In many cases the economic conditions will then at least lead to the en-
largement of these new companies. According to V.J. UZUN for these companies the limited
partnership is the legal form best suited and providing the largest perspective since it allows
them to take assets and land of the villagers in lease. However, the splitting of the enterprise
must be the result of a decision of the majority of the asset holders or the decision of the new
owner after the bankruptcy.
Let us now proceed to the problem of the economically weak, not solvent enterprises.
2.3 Problems of Weak Enterprises
One of the main problems of economically weak enterprises is their low productivity. This is
mainly caused by production capacities which are too limited, delays in the wage payment, and
weaknesses in the management.
Consequently, basic technology requirements are not complied to so that these enterprises dis-
play extremely low production parameters. Thus, the milk performance per cow, e.g., is often
less than 1000-1200 kilograms of milk, the number of calves per 100 cows amounts to only 55
- 60, the average daily increase in live weight with feeder cattle totals only 200 grams and with
pigs only 100 grams. With the majority of the weak enterprises the potato yield amounts to
only 50 - 70 dt/ha and with vegetables to 80-120 dt/ha. As compared to the period before tran-
sition, the production indices of these enterprises were at least twice as high. The non-
compliance with technological requirements diminishes the quality of the products and ac-
cordingly reduces the prices. Moreover, part of the products and resources in these enterprises
are also stolen by the employees.
The most important human cause for the bad performance is, however, an inefficient manage-
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enterprise free of charge or turned it into their own independent companies, which often was
the first step to the factual bankruptcy of the former enterprises.
With the majority of these enterprises the employees hardly trust the management not believing
that it can deal with the crisis effectively. On the other hand, also the managers do not trust
their employees. Thus, for instance the manager responsible for animal production does not
provide minerals and compound feed because he assumes that the milkers would only steal it.
The market production in the insolvent enterprises was reduced to a minimum, since it only
results in further losses. A minimum of income is needed in order to be able to pay the wages
of the management, the remainder is distributed among the employees. Hence, the wages in
these enterprises are, in fact, independ from the personal or the collective production perform-
ance. The accountancy calculates the total costs for the entire enterprise, but not for individual
departments. In these enterprises management and social services take up between 15 and 18
per cent of the total number of employees. The factual workload for an employee in such a
plant or animal production enterprise amounts to only half or even one third of the norm, i.e.
the number of employees exceeds the need by far. A main part of the agricultural land as well
as stables for animal production are not used.
In many enterprises more than 50 per cent of the asset holders are pensioners, former employ-
ees and other enterprise staff members who are not producing. This situation became charac-
teristical for many regions of Russia, particularly for the non-black-earth zone (BOEV et al.
1996, p. 10). In some cases the asset holders remaining in the co-operative decided to compen-
sate for the asset share in the form of goods, for instance with productive animals. Their value,
however, exceeded the liquidation value by far. In the legal form of the producers’ co-
operatives such developments are less likely since there only incorporators and employees have
the right to vote.
In general, the principal creditor of these insolvent enterprises is the state. The debts mainly
originate from commodity credits (fuel, mineral fertilizer etc) and from wage taxes. The gov-
ernment agencies hesitate to announce such enterprises bankrupt since they are afraid of a
worsening the already complicated social situation in the rural areas and do, moreover, not
expect to find purchasers for the assets of these enterprises. According to economic theory,
however, bankruptcy proceedings are a very efficient form of restructuring because they pro-
mote the fast redistribution production capacities to better entrepreneurs and prevent the ac-
cumulation of further losses. Whether these reasons indeed justify not carrying out bankruptcy
proceedings can be doubted. Here, it has to be pointed out that it also prevents enterprises
from becoming newly established.
With these enterprises the largest problem consists in the lack of suitable management per-
sonal. It is also difficult to find somebody intending to entrepreneurially use the remaining asset
parts of the enterprises. The lack of managers with the necessary qualification is also the big-
gest problem in the Russian agriculture. Therefore, the collectives of these enterprises often
reject a restructuring following the Nizni Novgorod model, i.e. splitting up. They rather prefer
to exist further as a collective hoping that subsidies will be continued to be paid to them.
3 THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATISATION
At present the property rights of the owners with regard to land in the collective enterprises
are extensively limited. They can only receive a physical piece of land if they leave the enter-
prise and establish their own farm. They can also bequeath their land share or sell it within the
respective enterprise. This hampers the process of reorganisation in agriculture, since other-EPSTEIN/SIEMER: Difficulties in the Privatization and Reorganization of the Agricultural Enterprises 15
wise successfully performing enterprises of all types and forms could, for instance, buy the
land. The implementation of the right to take a loan on or sell one’s land share would also fa-
cilitate the influx of capital from outside sources into agriculture. On the other hand it is a
widely held view that under the unprofitable economic conditions in agriculture the right to
take up loans or sell the land would hardly lead to considerable investments into agriculture.
Besides the price of the land would be rather low. Already for a small amount of money many
pensioners and persons of a pre-retirement age were willing to sell their pieces of land. In this
way many agricultural enterprises would be deprived of their production basis „land“, which
seriously damages agricultural production, even with the most effective suburban enterprises.
The opponents of a further liberalisation of the land market are also supported by the lack of
historic experience with private land property in Russia so that today the overwhelming major-
ity of the agricultural producers, among them also many farmers, oppose the free purchase and
sale of land.
In our opinion agricultural interests should be considered in liberalising the land market, e.g. by
a legal fixation of preemptions for agriculture. Besides those who gained their financial means
by illegal means must be prevented from abusing the land market for speculation purposes.
Finally, it is to be remarked that the conciliation committee of the Parliament discussed a com-
promise at the end of October 1996.
In our view in the further course of privatisation not only the share of private property of land
and assets must increase, but also the legal system must be developed further. This affects both
the regulation of the land market as well as the carrying out of bankruptcy proceedings. After
that as quickly as possible efforts should be shifted to the reorganisation and restructuring of
the agricultural enterprises. In this process the state should participate in the following tasks:
• Support of the working out of a methodology of the reorganisation of the various types of
agricultural enterprises
• Support of the managers taking over insolvent enterprises, particularly with contractual
regulations
• Distribution of experience of successful reorganisations
• Support of the scientific investigation researching reorganisation procedures for agricul-
tural enterprises.EPSTEIN/SIEMER: Difficulties in the Privatization and Reorganization of the Agricultural Enterprises 16
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